The Dynamic Annihilation of a Rational Competitive Fringe by a Low-Cost Dominant Firm*
Introduction
A low-cost dominant firm with no capacity constraint that can precommit to a price path is in an excellent position to drive constant average cost fringe firms from the market. SurprisinglYt much of the existing literature on dynamic models [e.g. t Gaskins (1970 Gaskins ( t 1971 J concludes that the dominant firm eventually limit prices with a positive number of fringe firms left in the market. This result in a dynamic model is especially disturbing since in a static model (the extreme case of a dynamic model where adjustment is instantaneous) all fringe firms will be driven from the market. We show that these earilier results are due to an unreasonable assumption about expectation formations.
Gaskins and others have assumed that fringe firms use myopic (adaptive) expectations when determining whether to enter or exit. We show that t when all of Gaskins' other assumptions are maintained t but firms use rational expectations t the dynamic model's steady state resembles that of the static model: All fringe firms are driven out by the time the dominant firm limit prices.
There are two basic strands of the literature on rtynamic models of dominant firms. In one strand t the rate of entry of fringe firms depends on the current price.
Examples of this literature include Gaskins (1970 Gaskins ( , 1971 and Baron (1973) .
In Gaskins' model, if there are initially few fringe firms t a low-cost dominant firm without a capacity constraint initially sets a high price which the dominant firm gradually lowers until it reaches the limit price so that a constan:, -2-positive number of fringe firms persist forever. Since price never falls below the limit price, at no time does exit occur. This result is startling when one realizes that, in a static model (where entry is instantaneous), such a dominant firm would drive out the fringe and be a monopolist. Gaskins' (1970 Gaskins' ( , 1971 ) results stem from his assumption that, while the dominant firm has rational expectations, the fringe firms use myopic expectations in their entry decisions: They only look at instantaneous profits.
Another strand of the literature uses a two-period and/or two-firm model.
Examples of this type of model include Kamien and Schwartz (1971) and De Bondt (1976) . In these models, period one is the interval until the arrival of one or more entrants (which is typically uncertain); period two is the remainder of time. These two-period models by their very nature cannot be used to study the complex pattern of entry and exit by fringe firms which we investigate here. Indeed, in Kamien and Schwartz (1971) , the price in the preentry period is a constant.
The reason that the dynamic models of Gaskins and his followers come to a counterintuitive result is that they assume that fringe firms form expectations that are not rational. Three papers consider similar problems with rational expectations. Flaherty (1980) assumes that firms are rational, but there is a single entrant with a cost functional identical to that of the existing firm. Judd and Petersen (1986) assume that fringe firms retain earnings in order to invest, and the dominant firm and the fringe play a~ash open-loop game. The fringe firms are rational and take the dominant firm's price as given, while the dominant firm takes the fringe firms' percent of retained earnings as given. Karp (1987) also has fringe firms determine optimal investment, hut uses a feedback model. Thus, these three papers Gaskins' (1970 Gaskins' ( , 1971 model is shown to be a special case of the general model where expectations are adaptive, and we compare his results to ours. We show that, even if fringe firms used adaptive expectations initial1y, it may be in the dominant firm's best interest to announce its longrun policy so that the fringe firms' expectations become rational. That is, if the fringe's expectation formation is endogenously determined, nonrational behavior may not persist.
We next consider a more realistic policy where the government restricts the dominant firm's market share. We conclude the paper with a summary and a discussion of the policy implications.
A general dynamic model
The dominant firm chose a price path over time, pet), to maximize the
where V is the present value of the dominant firm's profit stream, c is the average cost of production for the dominant firm (constant over time), f(p) is the market demand curve, xCt) is the level of sales by the competitive fringe (where each fringe firm produces one unit of output), r is all firms' discount rate, and (f(p) -x(t)] is the residual demand facing the dominant firm.
This functional is maximized subject to the evolution of the fringe, xCt).
The initial number of fringe firms is given:
Fringe firms then enter or exit the industry based on their expectations about the present discounted value of their future profits, yet). Because the cost of entry depends upon the speed of entry, frin~e firms do not enter instantaneously. The rate of entry is proportional to the expected present value of profits:
constant response coefficient~O. and y is the expected present value of a fringe firm's profits. We follow the common convention used by Gaskins (1970 Gaskins ( , 2 1971 ) and others that k is a constant. Because the number of fringe firms
where ne(t) are expected profits by a fringe firm at time t. k is a cannot be negative, the dominant firm also faces a state constraint, 
Before we can state the dominant firm's problem as one solvable by the maximum principle, we must reduce equation (6) to a form that does not include an integral by differentiating it with respect to tinle:
• y = ry + p -p.
The dominant firm which faces rational fringe firms chooses a price path at time t = 0 so as to maximize (1) subject to (2), (3), (5), and (7). The
necessary conditions for a solution to the problem of maximizing subject to a state constraint, (5), are given by Jacobson, tele, and Speyer (1971) .
The method of solution begins by forming the usual Hamiltonian,
where z and v are the costate variables corresponding to the state variables x and y and adjoining a multiplier, (w) , and the state constraint [x(t) > 0],
As with the usual Lagrangian methods. wx = 0 is necessary for optimality.
The rest of the necessary conditions are (a) the equations of motion, (2), (3), and (7) shown below, is finite), at which x becomes zero. For our problem, there are three jump-time conditions, which we state here. but discuss in more detail below.
First, because y is not constrained, v is continuous
where v(t-) is shorthand for limt~l vet).
t<T Second, because x is constrained, its multiplier jumps:
where <jl > o.
Lastly, the. Hamiltonian is continuous at (T):
Our construction of an optimal solution proceeds~y (1) describing the solution when there are competitive firms (the "interior" solution);
(2) describin~the solution 3fter these fringe firms are rlriven from the market (the "corner" solution); and, finallY, (3) piecing together the two types of solutions. 
05 ) We then equate equations (14) and (16) to eliminate v,
and differentiate with respect to time to obtain
-rt
Substituting into (18) for z from (13), for z from (17), and for y from (7),
we find that
Where demand is linear, f(p) = a -bp, equation (18) = 0,
,'.
.,' _.
.:;, Equation (21) gives the solution to the dynamic limit-price problem when thenã re fringe fims in the market. It depends upon two unknown parameters, a 1 and a Z ' These parameters are determined from the conditions joining interior and corner solutions, where x(t) = o.
We can show that the corner is reached in finite time since internal solutions that last forever and meet the transversality conditions eventually have (3) and (6) guarantee that x will gro~without bound, but this violates the transversality condition that -9-By substituting for p from (21) in (6) 
Because Yl < 0, eventually the last term on the right-hand side dominates;
and, since c -p < 0, lim x < O. Thus, an optimal policy starting with x > 0 tw ill eventually drive x to zero at some time, T. As a result, interior tra-
jectories that last forever are impossible. Hence, a Z may be nonzero. Since the constraint is eventually reached, we now consider corner solutions. .' .
will remain zero forever •
The proof of the proposition that, if x = 0 on an open interval, p = p, follows from continuity. Let x be zero from T l to T 2 (since x is continuous, it is zero at T l and T 2 as well). Since for T 1~t~T2 ,
y is certainly zero. Similarly,
so yet) = 0 implies that pet) = p, T 1~t~1 '2.
.:'
,"
:,.'
,:
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The final claim that once a corner solution is reached it will continue indefinitely follows from the principle of optimality. If it is optimal to set pCt) = p when x(t) = yet) = 0 at t = T l , it will be optimal to set p = p at any other time when xCt) = yet) = 0. Since x(t) = yet) = 0 for a corner solution and that implies pCt) = p, it follows that x(t + €) = yet + €) = 0 for small €, so the corner solution will last indefinitely. Thus, an optimal program that begins with competitive fringe firms will consist of one interior segment of finite length followed by a corner segment of infinite length, where pCt) = p and x(t) = 0.
Linking the interior and corner solutions
Matching the interior to the corner solution determines aI' a Z ' and T.
The definition of x, the continuity of the Hamiltonian, and the transversality condition at time zero give three equations to determine aI' a Z ' and t. This section derives each in turn.
Substituting for p from equation (21) in the definition of~in (2) and integrating between 0 and T gives our first condition:
where the second equality follows hecause X(T) = 0 by the definition of 1.
The continuity of the Hami Honlan implies that pCT) = p. Since f-f for given x, y, z, and v has a unique maximum in ry, H is said to be regular.
-11-Therefore, p is continuous at T and peT) = i> [Jacobson, Le1e, and Speyer (1971), p. 272] . This result also can he shown directly using (12). This second condition, p(T) = p, may be written as
The last condition comes from noting that v ( Equations (25), (Z6), and (27) determine aI' u 2 ' and T. (27 ) 3.4 The price path
The price path depends on the parameters of the system. Heuristically, iX o is relatively small (given the other parameters), the price starts high, falls below P, and then rises to p. Alternatively, if X o is relatively large, the price starts below pand then rises to p-.
In either case, as t~T, net) approaches p from below. The price must be below p for the dominant firm to drive the fringe firms out of the market.
After all fringe firms are driven out, price must remain at p or new entry would occur.
In the interior, the price path is described by equation (Zl). The path depends on a l and u z . From equation (Z7) and the associated argument,
'. , ,.
.'.
0.;
."
:} as shown in fig. 1 . As the figure shows, the dominant firm never predates in the sense that its price is always greater than c--its marginal and average cost. As the figure shows, in all cases price is above (P + c)/2.
Since p> c, (p + C)/2 >c.
A comparison of our model and Gaskins' model
In contrast to our model where fringe firms have rational expectations, Gaskins (1970 Gaskins ( , 1971 implicitly assumes that firms form their expectations myopically: Profits tomorrow will be the same as today. His entry condition is given as:
Equation (28) says that the rate of entry of fringe firms is a constant, K, times a fringe firm's instantaneous orofits.
Equation (28) can be derived from (3) and (4) if we assume that the potential entrants form their expectations mvopica1ly:
s~t, so
l----~-~==::::::::====== time
;.
FIGURE I. Properties of the Price Path -14-Using the maximum principle, Gaskins (1970 Gaskins ( , 1971 ) derives the solution .
consisting of the differential equations in x(t), as given by (28) above, and
Substituting for y from (29) into (3), we obtain Gaskins' (1970 Gaskins' ( , 1971 equation ( 28), where K = k/r.
(30) P
Equations (28) and (30) . .
The intersection of the p = 0 and x = 0 equations in the (p, x) plane determines the saddlepoint. Gaskins (1970 Gaskins ( , 1971 ) describes how to derive the unique trajectory meeting all of the necessary conditions.
The optimal paths of our model in (p, x) space and the path in Gaskins' (1970 Gaskins' ( , 1971 model are shown in fig. 2 for a case in which x o is relatively smal1. 3 Notice that the path in Gaskins' (1970 Gaskins' ( , 1971 ) model starts at a high price and falls to p where it remains, so a large finite number of frin~e firms (SO) produce in the limit. By contrast, the path in our model shows the price starting at a high price, falling below n, and then rising to p where it remains and x( t) = 0, t~T. Indeed, in this example, our model implies there are always fewer than 21 fringe firms. The myopic path approaches within 2 percent of the steady-state number of fringe firms (49 firms) in 106 time periods. At 112 time periods, the rational path reaches the maximum number of firms. The rational path hits the corner in 298 time periods.
Endogenously determined expectations
In many cases, even if the fringe firms have myopic expectations, it is in the dominant firm's best interests to announce its price path so that :he fringe firms' exPectations become rational. For example, given the parameters In this example if the fringe becomes rational, consumer surplus would fall from $8,870 to $5,715. Thus, total welfare (here defined as consumer surplus plus combined profits) falls from $16,366 to $15,398. That is, the firms' gain does not offset consumers' losses.
The models are too complex for us to derive general conditions when it is in the dominant firm's best interest to correct fringe firm's myopic beliefs.
We have found it difficult to find examples where it is not in the dominant firm's best interest to reveal its price path to the fringe; however, the welfare effect can go in either direction. 4
Market share constraint
The possibility of antitrust action may partially explain why one does not observe dominant firms driving their competition completely out of business.
Although neither statute nor case law sets absolute market shares that will support an antitrust conviction--a survey of recent cases shows findings of monopoly prnver were common above a 70 percent share and uncommon below a 50 percent share [Flynn (1981, p. 5l )]--a dominant firm may form strongly held views as to the crucial share at which they would face prosecution. For example, some years ago, General Motors apparently felt that 60 percent was the relevant number. In this section we examine the optimal actions of a Letting 6* > 0 be the maximum share that the dominant firm can attain without facing an antitrust suit, the control problem for that firm is to maximize the present discounted value of net revenues (profits):
Since x is certainly bOlmded away from zero hy 6 being hounded away from ne, this problem is unlike the original problem. It involves only a constraint on the control, 5, and not a constraint on the state variable, x. . ,.;
-20-Second, when the share constraint binds (6 = 8*), we rewrite the constraint as x = (1 -8*) (a -bp) and take its time derivative and set it equal to ky [using (3)]:
x= (6* -1) bp = kyo (38) ( 39) Differentiating (39) with respect to time and substituting ry + p -p for y .
using (7) and [(6* -1) bp]/k for y using (39), we obtain the second-order, ordinary differential equation
The solution to this differential equation is (40) \.mere pet)
There are many possibilities for an optimal path. Where 6 < 0*, optimal P aths begin on the R e rt = 0 line (the short-run, nrofit-maximizing Pc ondi tion) as interior segments. Eventually they reach the share constra int and equilibrium at p, but there are many possible routes. We use a set Col emmas to restrict the set of possibilities. For small enough x, the optimal path follows the constraint:
Lemma 1: If a path is optimal and xCt) < i, then (x(t), p(t))* lies on the share constraint.
Proof: Those points below the share constraint (see fig. 3 ) are not feasible. Thus, the optimal path must lie on or above the constraint. For x(t) < x, points above the share constraint are also above the R p e rt = 0 line. Above the R e rt = 0 line, increases in price decrease instantaneous p profit. Since increases in price also encourage entry which decreases future profits, prices above the share constraint lead to less instantaneous and future revenues and cannot be optimal.
By the same reasoning:
Lemma 2: The interior portion of an optimal path does not lie above the R e rt = 0 line at even a single point. The next two lemmas and the theorem describe the~eneral direction that interior optimal paths may follow. They show that the direction of travel is away from the R p e rt = 0 line.
Lemma 3: If, along an optimal interior arc above c, there is a time t for which negative so dldt (R e rt ) is negative, then dldt (R e rt ) remains • -rt z = Cp -c) e ,so z is increasing along ex, p)*.
Given the hypothesis of the lemma that dldt (R e rt ) is negative, these p The costate equation for z is
The costate equation (37) requires
increasing, it must be that dldt (R p e rt ) is negative and decreasing which establishes the lemma. -23-Corollary: An optimal path that begins with x < x travels along the share constraint toward (x. pl.
Proof: Lemma 1 shows that the path travels along the share constraint. Lemma 4 shows that, if the optimal path starts moving awaỹ
. from x toward lower x, x must remain negative forever and p must remain above p forever. Such a path is impossible since, if p is always above p, then y must be positive and hence xmust be positive.
Theorem 1: Let (x, p)* be an optimal path, and let (x, p)* be its tangent. When p is above p, I(x, p)*, N I < O.
Proof: The proof proceeds by contradiction: Assume that at some time t > 0, P > p, and I(~, p)*, NI > o. Three steps are needed to establish the contradiction. First, the optimal path may not remain above p. Second, if the optimal path passes below p, it will recross the p line; when it recrosses, the optimal path will be closer to the R e rt = 0 line than when p it first crossed. Third, since there is no limit point on the R e rt = 0 p rt line and optimal paths cannot cross R p e = O. an optimal path cannot become ever closer to R e rt = 0 which is the contradiction that estabp lishes the theorem.
It is impossible for an optimal interior path to remain within the triangle formed by the R e rt = 0 line, the p = p line, and the constraint.
p Lemma 3 shows that once ex, 0)* moves in the same half space as N it must move in the same half space as N as long as it remains in the interior. Therefore, it must eventually come to the boundary of the triangle. Lemma 2 establishes that an optimal path does not lie above the R p e rt = 0 line, so the optimal path must eventually hi t one of the other two boundaries.
The optimal path, ex. p)*, could join the constraint, but it would still have to move in the same direction as~which \vould mean that it either ; -24-becomes interior again in the same direction as N or crosses R p e rt = 0 which is impossible. Fig. 4 shows ( The value of p is the same (~) at hoth points where the optimal path crosses the p line, while the value of x is larqer at the second point (since 
26-
was positive at all times in between} so, at the second point, R e rt must p be smaller. Thus, R e rt must decrease regardless of whether or not the path is p above or below p. Since an optimal path cannot cross the R e rt = 0 line, and p there is no limit point on that line t it is not possible for (x t p)* to be constantly moving in the same half space as N, which establishes the theorem .
. Corollary: When (x, p)* is optimal and p < 0, then x < o.
• Proof: By contradiction, assume x > O. By the argument of the orevious .
theorem, p must eventually exceed p; and at that instant p > O. Since the direction of increasing x is the direction of decreasing p along the constraint--when p crosses p--(x, p}* must be interior. An interior path that has increasing p and increasing x must have '(~t p}*t NI > 0 which is impossible by the theorem.
Theorem 2: An optimal path does not cross p from below.
Proof: The proof proceeds by contradiction: Assume that (x, p)* is optimal and crosses the p = p line from below. Lemma 4 and the corrollary show that along a path crossing p from below t~< O. Since~< 0 at the time of crossing, there is some later time during which the fringe firms suffer losses. This implies that (x, p)* must recross p. Since the optimal p is the sum of two real exponential functions with real coefficients,~can change signs, at most, once. Recrossing p requires a change of sign so, after the recrossing, p < O. Given decreasing p and x, (x t p)* must intersect the constraint. The direction of decreasing p on the constraint t however, is the . . direction of increasing x, so (x, p)* could not be continuous at the point it meets the constraint which is a contradiction.
Theorem 3:~lce ex, p)* lies on the constraint belown t it will continue on the constraint until it reaches p where it will stop.
-27-Proof: The proof proceeds by showing that the a1ternative--exiting to an interior arc--requires the tangent to the interior arc to point in a direction that is not "high" enough to leave the constraint. A.long an interior are, since
Differentiating (42) with respect to time gives (v + rv) e rt = -2bp -X, which can be solved for pIx:
Along the constraint, dP! -1 ax constraint = bO -6J •
For an optimal path to leave the constraint, it must climb above it:
Since leaving the constraint with x < 0 means moving in the same direction IS .
:-.1, (v + rv) must be negative. Thus, the inequality asserts one positive rumber is greater than another. Returning to the constraint, however, requires~he . inequality to be reversed, which cannot happen. Since (v + rv) = -zk and z is -28-growing along the path, the left-hand side numerator of equation (43) • and x was initially negative. Since the numerator grows and the denominator shrinks (in absolute value) and neither of the parts changes sign, the inequality in equation (43) can never be reversed, so an interior path beginning on the constraint below pcan never return to the constraint. Thus, as with all other interior paths traveling in the same half space as N, this path cannot exist. The conclusion is that, once an optimal path joins the constraint below p, it continues along the constraint.
We are now in a position to describe the optimal path that begins in the interior (not on the constraint). Fig. 3 shows the phase space for this problem.
The arrows indicate what is known about the directions of travel.
The path begins on the R e rt = 0 line. By theorem (1), it travels in the p same direction as -N, as indicated in fig. 3 by the arrow labelled -N. It could intersect the share constraint ann travel down it and go from interior to corner solution any number of times; Sooner or later, it comes to rest at the intersection of the share constraint and p or it passes belowp. Once belowp, the corollary to theorem (1) shows that x must be decreasing, though the direction for p is unknrn~, as sholVTI in fig. 3 by the arrow below p. By theorem (2), the path cannot cross the p line from below. Thus, the only remaining posssibility is that of theorem (3): The path will join the constraint and move up it till it stops at the equilibrium.
7.
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Conclusions
When the fringe's expectations are rational and Gaskins' other assumptions are maintained, a low-cost dominant firm will eventually drive the fringe out of the industry. In doing so, the dominant firm will not predate (price below marginal cost).
In most, if not all, cases, it is in the dominant firm's best interest to reveal its intentions to the fringe--that is, the dominant firm makes it expectations rational.
It is generally not socially optimal nor in consumers' best interests for the government to set a minimum number of fringe firms. An antitrust policy which constrains the dominant firm's market share leads to a price Dath which is often qualitatively similar to the unconstrained path: falling and then rising. In both the constrained and unconstrained cases, the dominant firm limits prices and drives the fringe out or to the lowest market share allowable.
-'
, .~- lSee Flaherty (1980) for a defense of open-loop rather than closed-loop models in which firms incur adjustment costs and choose output rates.
2This Gaskins' (1970 Gaskins' ( , 1971 ) assumption, which we maintain, is not innocuous. The entry condition makes sense where the cost of producing the necessary capital is quadratic in the rate of capital production (for now, the marginal cost of making capital is set equal to the present value of the profits that capital produces); but this equation also makes the decision to scrap capital stock a, the mirror image of the investment process. The model also does not allow temporary shutdowns. 
